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The exchange of gifts or services was a central part of Roman social life, and 
Seneca’s De	beneficiis (‘On Benefactions’), is a lengthy and rich work that 
takes up such commerce in various contexts, from presents bestowed on friends 
to the hierarchical reciprocities of the patronage system. Although the work 
had for a long while been largely neglected, it has recently been the subject of 
several important investigations, and an excellent new English translation is 
now available as well.1 In this paper, I wish to examine one detail in the text 
that has not, I think, received entirely adequate discussion. This is all the more 
surprising since the passage in question is none other than Seneca’s definition 
of beneficium. His definition is quite unusual and to my knowledge has no 
precedent in the Greek or Roman traditions concerning mutual benefits. After 
considering the definition itself, I shall propose a possible explanation for how 
Seneca came to adopt it. Here, then, is Seneca’s definition of a benefit:




What, then, is a benefaction? It is a benevolent action that bestows joy and receives it in the 
bestowing, inclined toward what it does and primed on its own. Therefore what matters is 
not what is done or given, but with what attitude, since a benefaction consists not in what is 
done or given but in the very mind of the one who is doing or giving.2 
In the Introduction to their translation, Griffin and Inwood comment: 
This definition is the key to the most important novel claims in the treatise. The fact that 
genuine joy for both parties is an integral component of any benefit is a crucial feature, one 
that returns to influence debate at various points in the work. Even more important, the 
definition relies on a sharp distinction between the material object which may be the raw 
material of a benefit ... and the action which is the actual benefit.3
1 Griffin and Inwood 2011. See also Picone et al. 2009; Li Causi, 2012; Picone, 2013; Griffin 2013.
2 Author’s translation.
3 See Griffin and Inwood 2011, 4. How much Seneca’s view reflected Roman practice is, of course, 
debatable. Coffee (forthcoming) remarks: ‘Yet the remainder of Seneca’s discussion in De	 Beneficiis	
demonstrates that his emphasis on pleasure as integral to the exchange of gifts and favours (beneficia) was 
largely aspirational. Gift exchange was crucial to Roman social cohesion, but the institution was in danger 
precisely because its affective dimension was lacking. Hence Seneca’s repeated exhortations to preserve the 
exchange of beneficia	as something beyond the merely instrumental.’
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It is true that gaudium, or joy, is mentioned in several significant passages in 
the treatise: the noun and its associated verb, gaudeo, occur 17 times in all. For 
example, in the second book Seneca raises the question of anonymous gifts, 
where the recipient is not in a position to feel the appropriate gratitude. He 
argues that the giver should be content (contentus) in the knowledge of what 
he has done; otherwise, his delight (delectat) is not in doing the service but 
in being seen to have done it. Seneca grants that we should, when conditions 
permit, take note of the joy (gaudium) that derives from the recipient’s 
goodwill (I take it this is the giver’s joy); but it is bad form ever to remind a 
beneficiary of his debt to you (2.10). In a similar vein, he advises the recipient 
of a benefaction to manifest his joy (gaudium), so that the benefactor may 
gain the reward for his service (2.22): if we take cheer (laetitia) in seeing a 
friend cheerful, we take it all the more if we have made him so; indeed, he 
who accepts a benefaction graciously (or gratefully: grate) has paid back the 
first instalment. Again, Seneca argues that our aim in giving a benefaction 
is to help the recipient and grant him pleasure; the mutual joy that results 
is the fulfilment of this intention, and no further return is required, lest the 
transaction smack of commerce rather than generosity (2.31).4
The joy in bestowing a benefaction, according to Seneca, lies both in 
perceiving the cheer that it brings to the recipient, and in the knowledge that 
we have brought about that cheer, even if it is not manifested in the form 
of overt gratitude toward the benefactor (as in the case of an anonymous 
gift). In these passages, the benefit bestowed is not synonymous with the joy 
that results from it, whether for the donor or the recipient. What is given is 
assistance, which is certainly a cause of good cheer in the recipient when it is 
granted freely and without condescension, and this should bring delight to the 
giver as well; but the giver should also take delight independently in the mere 
knowledge of having done the service. The distinction is particularly clear in 
the final paragraph of Book 2, where Seneca affirms that the return of good 
will is not sufficient to repay a benefaction; rather, material compensation for 
the good received is also required. He writes: 
Gratitude (gratia) is returned for that benefaction which the action (actio) has accomplished 
if we receive it with goodwill (benevole), but we have not yet paid back that other [sc. debt] 
which consists in the value (res); rather, we wish to pay it back. We have compensated the 
intention (voluntas) with our intention, but we still owe value for value. (2.35)
4 Cf. 3.17: ‘If having received [a benefaction] is pleasing [iuvat] to a person, he enjoys a fair and continual 
pleasure [voluptas] and feels joy [gaudet], looking to the mind [animus] of the one from whom he received 
it, not to the value [res].’ The life of a grateful person, Seneca affirms, is cheerful and merry [laetus, hilaris], 
and he takes great joy [gaudium] from anticipating the chance to pay back the debt of gratitude [occasionem 
referendae gratiae expectans]. For other passages concerning joy in the context of benefactions, cf. 2.5, 3.3, 
3.31–2, 4.29, 5.20, 6.13.
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Yet Seneca’s definition of benefaction seems to strike a different note; for in 
affirming that a benefaction is ‘a benevolent action that bestows joy and receives 
it in the bestowing’, he would seem to be making the joy itself the gift: it is joy 
that is bestowed, and the benefactor’s joy derives precisely from granting this 
joy, as such, to the recipient. Rather than drawing a ‘sharp distinction between 
the material object which may be the raw material of a benefit ... and the action 
which is the actual benefit’, as Griffin and Inwood put it, it seems to me that 
Seneca is instead collapsing the difference between the actual service and 
the joy it brings. He does not say that a benefaction is a gift that causes joy; 
instead, Seneca boldly affirms that it is an act that grants precisely joy. What 
has induced Seneca to substitute joy for the gift that brings it?
Before attempting to answer this question, it is worth taking a closer look at 
Seneca’s definition to be sure that he has, as I am claiming, elided the substantive 
or material dimension of the benefaction. He asserts that a benefaction is ‘a 
benevolent action that bestows joy and receives it in the bestowing’: is the 
action [actio] distinct from the joy that is bestowed [the verb here is tribuere]? 
The action, we might argue, consists in giving the thing or service, that is, 
the res, whatever that may be; in the process, one person bestows joy on the 
other and receives it in so doing. Seneca goes on to say that, as a consequence 
of this definition (itaque), what counts is the attitude or disposition [mens] of 
the benefactor, not what is done or given [fiat, detur]: here, the subject of the 
verbs fiat and detur must be the service or gift, not the joy: clearly Seneca 
is aware here, as elsewhere, that a benefaction is a two-sided phenomenon, 
involving both a material transfer and the bestowal of joy that accompanies 
it. And yet, the bare definition seems to isolate joy as the essential element in 
the benefaction, occluding the practical benefit and return. A benefaction is an 
action that bestows gaudium: that is what is given, and it is in that coin that the 
benefit is repaid, even if the beneficiary should fail to express gratitude, much 
less pay back the material debt, as in the case of anonymous gifts.
A sufficient explanation of Seneca’s phrasing may be his desire to render 
benefactions by their very nature both non-commercial and reciprocal. 
But there may be a further influence upon his thinking, deriving from his 
interpretation of traditional views of favours and the gratitude they ought to 
inspire in the recipient. Aristotle devoted a chapter of his Rhetoric to gratitude, 
in which he affirmed that a favour (kharis) is ‘a service to one who needs it, 
not in return for anything, nor so that the one who performs the service may 
gain something, but so that the other may’.5 In return for such an altruistic 
5 That the chapter is concerned with the pathos of gratitude rather than kindness or benevolence is argued 
in detail in Konstan 2006, ch. 7.
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benefaction, one is expected to feel gratitude, which in Greek is expressed 
by the phrase, ‘to have kharis’ (kharin ekhein): the idea is that receiving the 
benefaction or kharis puts one in the position of owing it in turn – not, to be 
sure, in the same coin as it was given, since the gift was by definition wholly 
disinterested, but rather in an emotional sense, as a feeling that reciprocates 
the good intentions of the benefactor. Latin has a similar usage: gratia may 
signify a favour, whereas gratiam habere is the standard expression for 
gratitude (where there is no danger of ambiguity, gratia alone may signify 
gratitude).
Much of what Seneca will have to say about benefactions is already 
implicit in Aristotle’s brief treatment, including the notion that they must look 
wholly to the benefit of the recipient and that recompense takes the form of 
gratitude rather than material compensation. Nevertheless, the favour itself is 
understood to take the form of a concrete service or gift. As Aristotle explains 
in his customary crisp style (Rhetoric II 7, 1385b6–9): 
One must also consider all the categories. For it is a kharis either because it is this particular 
thing or of such a quantity or sort, or at such a time or place. An indication of this is if they 
did not do a lesser service [when it was needed], and if they did the same things or equal 
or greater for one’s enemies: for it is then obvious that what they did for us was not for our 
sake. Or if they knowingly did an unworthy service: for no one will confess to have needed 
what is unworthy. 
The Stoics would seem to have treated kharis in this context in much the 
same way, at least to go by the one clear example I have found. According to 
Plutarch,6 the Stoics maintained that the unwise neither receive favours nor 
have benefactors [euergetai]; hence, there is no such thing as ingratitude, since 
the good acknowledge a favour (kharis) and the bad are incapable of receiving 
one. They reason that a favour (kharis) is among middle or indifferent things; 
truly to help or be helped pertains to the wise, but ordinary people too can 
receive a favour (kharis), though they will not make good use of it.7
There is, however, another sense of kharis, which signifies something 
more like ‘gratification’ or ‘delight’.8 For example, in Euripides’ Trojan	
Women (1108), erôs is said to bring ‘sweet kharis’, where the meaning is 
plainly ‘joy’ (cf. Medea 227, Aristophanes Lysistrata 865; in prose, Plato 
6 SVF 672 = Plutarch De communibus notitiis 1068D.
7 It should be emphasized that our knowledge of earlier Stoic treatments of benefactions is scanty; Griffin 
2013, 24 notes that Seneca mentions Chrysippus and Hecato, another Stoic, but concludes that, although it 
would be illuminating to know more about Seneca’s working methods and his treatment of his sources, ‘the 
evidence is not there’. 
8 LSJ s.v. kharis, def. IV.
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Gorgias 462D: khara kai hêdonê, ‘joy and pleasure’).9 In this latter usage, 
the meaning approximates that of the related word, khara, which properly 
signifies ‘joy’.10 Now, khara plays a special role in Stoic ethics: it is one of 
the three so-called eupatheiai, that is, the positive emotions or sentiments 
that the sage experiences, as opposed to the pathê to which ordinary people 
are vulnerable.11 The Latin equivalent of khara is laetitia, as we can see in 
Lucretius, who thus renders Epicurus’ use of the term; in the De	beneficiis, in 
turn, Seneca treats gaudium and laetitia more or less as synonyms, as we can 
see from 2.31 (quoted above).
I would like to suggest, then, that Seneca may have read – or more strictly, 
have chosen to read – kharis in Aristotle, or in a text indebted to Aristotle’s 
analysis, as signifying not just a favour, nor again, in the manner of Chrysippus, 
a gift that falls short of a benefaction because the receiver is incapable of using 
it well, but rather took it in the sense of khara or ‘joy’. He thus had a model 
of sorts for his affirmation that a benefaction resides precisely in the bestowal 
of joy. This is the currency in which the exchange takes place, as opposed to 
the material service. The joy of giving, then, arises not from the benefactor’s 
awareness of having brought cheer to the recipient, but is the very thing given 
and received.12 In reconstruing the idea of a benefaction in these terms, Seneca 
has rescued it for Stoic ethics.
9 In SVF 1181 = Plutarch, De communibus notitiis 1065D, the term is employed rather in the sense of 
‘grace’ or ‘charm’: expressions ugly in themselves may nevertheless produce kharis in a poem as a whole.
10 For a survey of khara in classical Greek and early Christian thought, see Ramelli and Konstan 2010, 
185–204.
11 See SVF 431 = Diogenes Laertius 7.115; 439 = Plutarch On Moral Virtue 449A.
12 Li Causi 2008, 97–8 makes the astute suggestion that the material exchange in a benefaction can be 
considered a signifier in relation to the attitude or voluntas of the giver, which serves as the signified: 
‘Quello che accade, in altri termini, è che nel momento stesso in cui il beneficium	viene – per così dire – 
spiritualizzato, la dimensione della materialità, lungi dall’essere del tutto ripudiata (come invece accade 
per i seguaci del platonismo), viene di fatto relegata in secondo piano, dal momento che alle res scambiate 
o elargite si assegna la funzione strumentale di significanti	per mezzo dei quali “comunicare” il beneficio 
vero e proprio, che viene identificato con la voluntas	di beneficare.’
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